3; Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

near Sūq al-Arba' of Taurīrt. Olive oil, extracted from a communally owned olive grinder and oil press, is the essential fat (1).

The fields, orchards and vegetable gardens (the latter producing broad beans, chickpeas, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, peppers and carrots, to mention only a few) of the Aith Wuryāghil are usually terraced near the houses, along the slopes of the mountains. The vineyards, whither the families repair in September to pick grapes, are further up; and along the crests are the communal goat pastures and the *ghāba* patches, where the women go to cut brushwood for their ovens and for the local mosque. Grape picking is the only important activity in September, which marks the end of the agricultural year; after this is done and after the barley has been reaped and threshed and the silos piled up, people make merry and get married before the first rains begin again and the time to plow and sow has started up once more.

Herding and agricultural contracts of a verbal nature are made between the wealthier and the poorer men of the community, those who have little hiring themselves out to those who have more (2). Individuals who own more animals than they can pasture themselves hire herders who, while the beasts are in their charge, receive all the milk and butter and half the young ones born, and, when the animals are sold, half the profits; if the contract concerns sheep, they receive half the wool as well. Vegetable gardens and orchards are cared for by hired gardeners *(rabbā')* who receive one-fourth of the fruit and vegetable crop; as their job entails setting up terraces, they sometimes get one-third of the vegetables if the land is difficult to work. These same men, if they also perform all the operations necessary for cereal cultivation, are called *ikhammāsen* and receive one-fifth of the barley and wheat crop. The owner of the field supplies the seed, the animals (usually cows) and the plow as well in this type of contract, while the *akhammās* (sing. of *ikhammāsen*) provides only his muscles and a switch to keep the cattle moving while they are under the yoke. The *akhammās* contract is the most

(1) Coon, Carleton Stevens: **Caravan, The Story of the Middle East**, New York 1951, p. 313.

(2) Sánchez Pérez, Andrés: **Aprovechamientos comunales y formas de cooperación en las yemaas del Rif, Africa**, Madrid, Noviembre 1947, pp. 75-77.

3: Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

The akhammās contract is the most
common type, but also current is a slightly different class of association, called *ifarādhen* (Arabic *bil-farḍ*): two farmers who own plots of land more or less equal in size, but who do not have enough equipment to plow them on their own, join forces; the harvest is divided equally between the two parties. This form is particularly prevalent if each man concerned only possesses one cow or one mule. A third kind of association, called *dhūrī*, is very common in irrigable land; in this, one man supplies the land and half the seed, and the other the rest of the seed and the plowing equipment (animals and plow). The actual work, which may be done by an *akhammās*, and the payment of other hired personnel to help with the reaping, is taken care of by both parties, and the net profit, deducting one-fifth for the *akhammās*, is divided in half.

Except in the Bay of Alhucemas, where irrigation is practiced without terracing, and in the valley of the Upper Ghīs, where there is much terracing but little irrigation, irrigation ditches (*tharga*, pl. *tharghiwīn*) and terraced fields, gardens and orchards are everywhere else to be found jointly in Aith Wuryāghil; the distribution of the one is virtually the same as that of the other. Ownership of irrigation water is largely dependent upon ownership of land, for in Aith Wuryāghil the owner of a plot of land is also the owner of the subsoil, and the waters which pass through his territory belong to him. Water is utilized by human beings, animals, lands and industries; rights of preference are in that order, the industries being represented by water mills (3), the owners of which receive one-tenth of the grain which the mills grind as their commission.

The Rīf, however, is a land not favored by nature, and water is a perennial problem. In Aith Wuryāghil, the people in the mountains receive first use of the water, while those in the Bay of Alhucemas irrigate with the remainder. The turns of each family in getting water are based on the principle of equal distribution, and natural means are used to calculate the time. Men have first call on water consumption, and the rest is reserved for women, for whom it is custo-

(3) Blanco Izaga, Emilio: El Rif (2.ª parte-La Ley Rifeña): II. Los Cánones Rifeños Comentados, Ceuta 1939, pp. 101-138.

312 The
562 jma'ths agree on the amount of the fines to be imposed for infractions
[623] of these rules, especially those having to do with the freedom of
[681] women, forbidding the men either to come near them or to remain in those paths which lead to their washing or bathing sites. Ordinarily, in this case, a turn is set up for a boy to act as guard, at a prudent distance from the site, if the latter by its topographical situation or by its distance from the village renders such a move necessary.

D) Irrigation in General:

312 The utilization of water in the Central Rif, particularly
615 among the Aith Waryaghar, is the object, in both general and particular cases, of agreements between the users; these agreements are made at the beginning of the summer for those water points which have a small or intermittent flow and which are of short duration. These agree-
[212] ments are also usually unwritten, and they deal with the following points: 1) dams, 2) network of irrigation ditches, 3) repairs to ditches, 4) turns (nubth, pl. nubath) of those who irrigate, and 5) infractions and sanctions.

[466] The labor as well as the necessary repairs are done by compulsory personal service (twiza)[119] and proportional contributions
[333] on the part of the irrigators. Any ditches which need special work done on them, such as bridges or retaining dams, are previously agreed upon to be done by contract with master-masons, with the cost of the materials included.

312 Infractions are usually reduced to: 1) appropriation by anyone
689 of a turn or turns of water outside or exceeding his own, and 2)
241 differences and disputes which during the "Republik" were settled
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amicably by irrigation specialists (aquwwam, pl. iquwwamen). In the latter instance, these specialists estimated the amount of damage done, and the individual who caused it had to pay for it.[120] The only penalty, most of the time, was indemnity of such damage, through, above all, small reparation projects. In case a man was also punished by fining, the fines were converted into improvements in the irrigation ditches. The irrigators did not make up special communities with their own jurisdiction or functionaries dedicated to the inspection and fulfillment of the agreements, because this rudimentary society was not fond of bureaucrats(!).....

The difficulty with these irrigation agreements rested primarily, more than on the distribution of the flow of water, on rather the outline of the ditch, for which it was necessary to acquire previously the consent of each one of the property owners on whose plots of land it ran over; these individuals did not ordinarily give in unless they themselves were given an irrigation turn; and, in addition, they made it clear that the ditch was not to cross their land but to follow the boundaries around it.

Irrigation turns, in the instances dealt with here, are simple, and correspond to the same notion which will later be discussed for the bigger water-courses, and which is based upon the principle of equitable distribution, with the utilization of natural means to calculate the time. This is reduced, once the number of turns is known, to fixing the duration of these and the order in which they occur. This customarily takes place at the point of origin of the ditch or dam; once assembled, the irrigators draw lots, by which each one of them puts down a straw while another, with his back turned,

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571 calls out the order of the turns by picking at random each one of the straws from the place in which they were deposited.[121]

E) Use of Rivers

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675 River waters are submitted, in general, to the same considerations as mentioned above. Their free utilization by owners of riverain land has no stipulation other than that of respecting the preferential rights of upstream lands and of avoiding damage to irrigation work [181] which has already been done. The jursidiction of the riverain people does not extend to the middle of the river-bed, for, as the latter often channels out new and diverse courses due to the torrential regimen of these water-courses which undergo constant variation and subsequent modification of their banks, this would give rise to infinite incidents and frequent modifications of agreements; and all of this would be contrary to the Rifian character, essentially conservative and traditionalist.....There is also another important reason for [618] [619] understanding why this is so, this being that these long-distance water-courses cross the territories of different tribes, ones which are even independent among themselves (and certainly from each other!); and in the event that any agreements at all have been reached about water distribution, these would have been extremely difficult to fulfill and would no doubt have originated not a few fratricidal wars and augmented the already numerous points of friction.

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675 Any other form of action would have been incompatible with the
312 essence of (the social behavior of) this society at the moment in which we are studying it, in which tribe, its clans and smaller segments all have such possessive notions of the property on their territories

that this would have rendered useless all demands and threats voiced by downstream groupings for the transfer of even a minimal amount of flow, and in our time things have not varied; those upstream use all the water that they can, and those downstream, the overflow; and it would not occur to anybody to vary this procedure, followed since time immemorial. To this procedure is very well adapted the regimen of the rivers in the Rif, in the dry beds of which water does not run on the surface, but rises up only in fixed points, each one of these forming, with the help of improvised dams, the sources or points of origin of successive irrigation ditches, making them seemingly independent.

In addition, the narrow fissures which form the beds of such torrential rivers, their irregular flow, their devastating overflows and floods, in short, opposed nature and men so that the latter would have some motive for doing this and even need it for their small irrigable crop and the bare necessities of life; for it did not and would not occur to anyone to work or cultivate any more land than that necessary for his own subsistence, as anything else, overflow aside, would have attracted the envy of neighbors and strangers, and this in turn would have led to blows. An association on such a large scale and for such modest objectives was, for this reason, impossible, inefficacious and unnecessary.

The river waters, in their upper courses, running between steep banks, scarcely need to be utilized even to a small degree on the minute riverain plots of land. In those beds, water, although actually slight in amount, is in fact overabundant, and land is lacking. Limited to the confines of the ditch by the topographical conditions

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423 The Rifian admits anything which constitutes instruction or improvement; but naturally he wants no part of any division of his
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648 holdings with strangers. T[illegible]s blessing of water which the official organ (i.e. the Spanish administration) as well as individuals receive, although the latter do so only to a limited degree, is not a product of technique, profitable or exemplary work as new developments would be, possible economic outlets or improvements in the present distributive net, but utilization of native labor in the style of some early-day anghar.

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Gar Rare are the days of the Makhzin irrigation turn in which the
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[427] Makhazniya does not present us (i.e. the administration) with some miserable akhammas[123] accused of the terrible crime of having been surprised at night attempting to lead up a thread of water into his tiny, dried-up holding, a crystalline fiber which, if it even arrives there to irrigate, only God knows; and the nubth which the Europeans derive from it, dispute from it and gain from it, did not cost them the least effort to lead up nor did they do anything other than wait sitting down while the Makhzin appropriated it. And in such a case neither the Makhzin nor the European stands to gain anything; to the contrary, they have much to lose.

F) Irrigation in the Plain of Al-Husaima:

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675 The usage of irrigation water from the Lower Ghis and Nkur Rivers has been, since time immemorial, the object of individual agreements among the irrigators, agreements which are usually put down in writing, for the flow of water, although variable, permits a regular distribution through permanent ditches, a distribution known

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(648)

to all and a distribution which tradition has affirmed. These principal ditches carry water all year round, and at the present time their utilization seldom gives rise to incidents, as their usage has been stabilized and regulated, except in the case of the newly arrived Spanish irrigators, whose despondent attempts to improve their lands with fanciful enlargements, amplifications or regularizations of turns gave rise to the only disputes, aside from the ill-will of the local population already mentioned above.

To be able to find something which leads us to the heart of the irrigation problem, it is necessary for us to look again among the individual agreements which are established by small groups of irrigators from both rivers, and descend through their steep beds to the widenings at their mouths, the journey over which has permitted us to observe the details of their irrigation system and to fix the principal idea which appears to preside over the distribution of the waters of both rivers into a diagram which we have made (see Irrigation Ditch Map of Plain of al-Husaima) for a better understanding and as a synthesis of their custom; and this is completed afterward with an outline of the network of ditches for each irrigated area and in these drawings is summarized our knowledge up to the present time.

312 The mechanism behind the distribution of irrigation water in Aith Waryaghar is simple, and up to the present time, it has satisfied local needs; it seems exact enough for the tribesmen, and so far they have shown no desire to modify it.

In the river beds there are certain points known to the people where the water always rises up; these are used as dams (uggug, pl.

312 lead the water to which he has a right in any of the main ditches into
571 these three smaller ones. The ditch of Tuth, when it has water, moves
613 the mill of Dharwa nd-Hajj Mis'aud. The irrigators of the Tafadhna
[402] ditch, whether the turn is interrupted or not, have the right to use
that of Shimurra, but giving first choice to those who use it regularly.

16. QANUN OF THE NKUR RIVER (AITH WARYAGHAR):

312 The Nkur River has an irrigation regimen which is less exact than
675 that of the Ghis, and the written agreements on the distribution of its
waters are few and recent. One of them refers to the division of waters
between the Axt Tuzin and the Aith Bu 'Ayyash, with the intervention of
the Bureau of the Aith Waryaghar (in Ajdir).[146] In any case, the
establishment of such agreements is based upon the same notions and
the same norms as in those pertaining to the Ghis.

312 In the Middle and Upper Nkur, there is more than enough water to
[621] irrigate the meanders which the river has created, through which it is
easy to affix by-laws to the 'azibs[147] of the neighboring jma'ths which
own land on its banks, given the small amount of land under irrigation.
[241] There is even freedom and waste, and it is not uncommon to see, during
harvest time, the formation of tiny threshing floors with capricious
irrigation-furrows of 300 and 500 meters in the middle of the river bed.

[619] There are meanders like Dhaghzwith n Dasa (upstream, in the territory of Axt Tuzin, and near the bridge on the right bank) and Dhazurakhth (downstream, in the territory of the Aith Bu 'Ayyash, and also right beside the same bridge, but on the left bank), which are of relatively large dimension and which have already stabilized turns; but the real difficulties and concomitant near-perfect solutions are

[See pp. 361-369--Analyst]

312 Dharga (Sidd)n Bujinn: Downstream from Dharga 'Arridh, in front [402] of Dharga n Dahar. It reaches Habbuqush[167] and moves three mills (Sriman Muhammad u Bari, Hammadi n Muh u Bari and Hmid Hammadi).[168] [571] It has two turns, for the Thimsaman and the Aith Bu 'Ayyash.[169]

Dharga Iznagen: Downstream from Bujinn, it reaches Habbuqush and [571] has the following turn cycle: Imrabdhen n Bu Zwiqa, I'abbuthen, Ims'- [402] sudhen, Habbuqush and Thabirkhashth.[170] It moves three mills (Hmid n 'Amar, Si Mhand u bil-Qasim, and Muhammad n bil-Hajj).

Dharga nj-Fars: only in time of abundance.

104 Vocabulary: water-aman; irrigate-sissu; irrigator-itsissau; turn-nubth, pl. nubath; dam-uggug, pl. uggugen; sluice or dyke-sidd; ditch-dharga, pl. dhargiwin or dhargwin; irrigation furrow ("donde se rompe agua")- anqssar, pl. inqssaren; water or irrigation expert-aquwwam, pl. iquwwamen;[171] land-dhamurth; garden, orchard-dhabhirth.

17. DOCUMENT REGARDING THE DIVISION OF IRRIGATION WATER: TRANSLATION:

675 614 312 578 423 691 Praise be to God. After the truce (sulh) took place between the three subclans, which are comprised by the people of Ajdir and those who are with them, those of the Imhawren and the ones with them, and those of the Imrabdhen and the ones with them,[172] the water of the River Ghis which is born (literally, "comes out") in the springs of Bu Harishen and in those below it was partitioned into three irrigation ditches, in conformity with what is set down in the document which records the testimony of those who have agreed to it, the Shaikh Muhammad bin 'Ali bin Shu'aib Amhawil, wishing to appropriate for himself the water which exists above the springs, whose water is

usufructed by 'Abdallah bin Ahmad Arhawif and his brothers Awlad 'Ali bin Ahmad[173], because the water of the latter is independent of that which was concluded in the agreement, proceeded to hinder it from those (individuals and social groupings) mentioned in the above pact, alleging that it was prejudicial to the water which was the object of the agreement.

He and the Sayyid Misa'ud bin 'Ali al-Ajdiri, wakil (legal representative) of the people of Ajdir and Imrabdhen, appeared for judgment before the servant of the Sultan (may God protect him[174]), the Qa'id Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Salam bin 'Abd al-Sadaq and before the distinguished and good jurisconsults and other (persons), who advised them to work out an arrangement, as is ordered in the Book (Koran) and in the traditional law (Shar'), by whatever exists in it of benefit to both parties and by the fear of what could happen as a grave emanation from the quarrel. By virtue of this, the water cited above as the object of litigation shall be divided into three parts. One-third of it, the amount of which is that of four days of irrigation, is for the aforementioned Shaikh Muhammad and his associates in irrigation; and the other remaining two-thirds, the amount of which is that of eight days of irrigation, shall be channeled into the three irrigation ditches which were the object of the first agreement made, and which emanate from the springs of Bu Harishen.

In conformity with the above, the litigation was considered as finished, as mentioned above.

No trouble remaining between them, by virtue of the above, (as well as) no quarrel, no proof, nothing which could continue the debate

675 578 through allegation, no litigation related to the water cited above. If any of them should demand the continuation of the debate through the presentation of proofs or arguments, everything would be null and void, for neither the present nor the future provides for this. Both parties have renounced all arguments, both public or private, which they could allege, as well as all the successive declarations (or reclamations) which could be brought forth to impede putting this agreement into effect.

600 A valid and executive arrangement. Both parties attending know the value of the present act, and, by virtue of it, the undersigned notaries, who know them to be in a perfect state of legal capacity (who know them to be of sound mind and memory), make their testimony. On 28 Qa'da al-Haram of the year 1250 (March 28, 1835).

A signature follows, illegible and signed. Another illegible signature follows the first.

Legalization by the qadi: Praise be to God.--I give faith (or testimony) to the above after both 'udul (notaries) have done so.--Servant of his God.--Signature (of qadi) illegible.

18. A SHAHADA ON WATERS: TRANSLATION:

695 312 (693) Praise be to God.

Both the undersigned notaries compile the testimonies presented by the respected 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'Umar al-'Alawi, the honorable 'Umar bin 'Ali, the respected Talib 'Isa Ajtuh, and the honorable Muhammad al-'Arusi, all of the Bani Waryaghal, in which they testify (the testimony of God is the perfect one) that the water ditch, (the property) of 'Abdallah bin Ahmad Amhawil al-Khattabi al-Waryaghli[175]

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465 Although the akhammas association is the most prevalent, it is only one of several such arrangements. Another sort of laborer is the amkari, who is hired for sowing and odd jobs about the house. His salary is not fixed and he is apparently paid in cash and clothing (Hart 1956:75). Another type of traditional [233] work association is the amikhan, who is a youth employed to herd a man's goats and sheep. He ". . . is hired for a fixed period . . . [and] gets a non-stipulated sum at the end of his contract" (Hart, ibid.:75). Such an arrangement is graphically portrayed in Bowles' translation of Charhadi's autobiographical novel, A Life Full of Holes. Another form of association is the arabba' who cultivates household gardens, orchards, and trees. He is given a fourth of the fruit and vegetable crops; if the terrain is difficult to terrace, his portion is adjusted (Hart 1956:75). [256] Most mill owners employ an assistant to do the grinding, and from the mill owner's portion the worker receives a fourth of the grain.

The common element of this sort of association seems to be that the salary the laborer earns is determined by customary regulations rather than by the supply and demand of workers. It [571] is an association between the elite and the poor which is based [565] on a fixed compensation and outside of any regulation by the market economy.

675 A correlate of this situation in which commercial arrangements are based on social factors is the irrelevance of written contracts. Whereas contractual agreement forms the basis of most

675 commercial transactions in an industrial society, legal surety in the Rif tends to be based on prestige, reputation, and status. Rights, privileges, duties, immunities, and liabilities are mostly non-contractual (excluding land titles and marriage documents). Thus working associations between the wealthier and poorer men of the community, whereby a laborer who provides all the work on another man's piece of property and receives one-fifth of the crop, are always verbal agreements. Likewise, agreements over such a critical area as water rights, including the rotation of rights of irrigation, are exclusively verbal. Partnerships, pledges, leases, warranties and so forth are rarely 'paperized' but based, rather, on verbal agreement.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how the social and cultural configuration of Berber existence affects the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Among the Riffians wealth as an abstract has little meaning. Wealth gains significance when it is an attribute of prestige (although prestige does not depend entirely on wealth). Prestige is gained from living by the code of the community and fulfilling one's obligations to the community. Those who fulfill such obligations have political prestige both in the realm of the Berber community and outside it. A direct consequence of this is that profit as a system of motivation has little operative or analytic value in determining what happens to material goods. Resources are not 'free'; they cannot be allocated in a social vacuum to obtain maximum financial rewards. On the contrary, resources are socially 'bound' by

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

Contracts and Coöperation

675 464 171 241 When tribesmen are unable or unwilling to work their own land, contracts are made between the wealthier and the poorer members of a community; those who have little land or equipment hire themselves out to those who have more. Farmers who have more animals than they or their sons can manage, make agreements with others to care for the herd. The hired shepherds, while the animals are in their hands, receive part of the milk and butter, some of the young that are born, and, if the animals are sold, a share of the profit. The shepherd receives part, sometimes half, of the wool. Full-time employment as a shepherd is considered rather degrading, and for this reason it is the common occupation of exiles and orphans.

Vegetable gardens, orchards, and fields may be cared for by hired laborers. If their job entails the difficult task of setting up terraces, they may get up to a third of the crop. If they perform all the operations necessary for cereal cultivation, they receive a fifth of the crop. If the hired hand needs an assistant during the reaping, the latter is paid with a tenth of the harvest. Associations of this sort are not common; farm labor is ordinarily done by the landowner and his sons.

476 241 171 A second type of association takes place when two farmers own plots of about the same size but do not have enough animals or equipment to work their land independently. The two farmers join forces, each supplying his share, and the harvest is divided between them. This form of coöperation is common when a farmer has only one draft animal. In irrigated areas, one man may supply the land and part of the seed, and another the rest of the seed, the animals, and the plow. Since most communities are kinship groups, coöperation of this sort is usually among brothers or cousins.[15]

Inheritance

428 171 The inheritance of property[16] in most of Morocco follows standard Maliki practice, which allots a share to each son equal to that falling to two daughters. When a man dies his widow first receives one-eighth of his property and the remainder is divided among the sons and daughters. All sons inherit equally, as do all daughters. If a man dies leaving a widow and daughters only, the widow gets one-eighth and the remainder is divided into three parts, of which the daughters receive two and the father's brother one. If the father has no brothers, the rest (aside from the widow's share) goes to the daughters. If he does have brothers, and dies leaving only one daughter, she receives half of the property (minus the widow's share) and the brothers get the other half. If a man dies leaving no children, his widow receives a fourth of his property and the rest goes to the brothers. If a man with children dies prior to his father, the children have no right to the property and receive shares only if the grandfather agrees to such a division.

[423] Moroccans are very reluctant to divide up their land. When brothers inherit land they customarily work it jointly, the eldest brother acting as a substitute

[113] [15] On contracts and coöperation, see also A. Sánchez Pérez, "Aprovechamientos comunales y formas de cooperación en el Rif," *Selección de conferencias pronunciadas en la Academia de Interventores durante el curso 1950–51* (Tetuán: Imprenta Cremades, 1951), pp. 95–104.

[113] [16] This paragraph is based upon the remarks of D. M. Hart in *Morocco: Subcontractor's Monograph* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 141–143.

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628 reals; 5,000 if it only wounded him; if the bullet missed its
613 goal, 2,500. The marksman, however, fortunate or awkward,
726 perished the next day, struck perhaps by a child hidden with a
[435] gun in a thicket of lentiscus.

It is understandable that under these conditions the notion of
613 "khoms" is often obscure; the only group that can exist then is
619 the family, around which assemble by bonds of adoption and marriage the weakest groups and the outsiders so as to form the "tarfiq."

613 Discords sometimes become so violent that material life
628 frequently stops; only the women then dare to go out into the fields; the men come to pray at the mosque without abandoning
613 their guns. In these circumstances, the family heads of the
628 whole country gather together in order to decide on a "ribat,"
675 which is respected for several months. This name is given to a solemn agreement that binds all the members of the neighboring tribes to repress, by means of very high fines, murders, rapes, large thefts, aggressions at the markets or on the roads leading to
[681] them. The sums paid by the guilty, which can climb to several thousand douros, are divided among the contracting tribes. The "amghars," heads of the most powerful families, have only the small personal part that goes to them just as to mere individuals.

628 Among the less turbulent tribes of the Rif, as at Targist, at
184 Zerqet, among the Beni Gmil, private wars have not reached as
621 great a development since the inhabitants still succeed in living grouped in hamlets. The "mouda^{c}" or subfractions and even the
632 "khoms" sometimes summon all the warriors in order to deliber-
621 ate common affairs. This meeting, to which each one comes
613 armed, takes the name "agrao" as in the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ and the Moyen-Atlas /Middle Atlas/. Sometimes the chiefs of
[681] each of the important families put at the head of the khoms an
[671] amghar whose role is to see to the application of the customary law, to have the fines, or "insaf," paid, with which crimes are punished according to rules known by all, but not written. Like
[652] the moqaddem in the western Atlas, this amghar collects one third of the "insaf"; the other two parts go to the tribe.

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/252 cont./

/Footnote 1 continued./ Doutté thinks, on the contrary, that it is a matter of a purely Berbère /Berber/ institution and one that is explained by the sacred and redoubtable character of the woman.

Several markets reserved for women exist among the Beni Ouriaghel of the Rif in a very Islamized region.

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In the Rif, where anarchy develops spontaneously and spreads much farther than in the South of Morocco, the protection of the markets is the occasion chosen by the tribes of the vicinity to conclude an alliance, a "ribat." But here again in these meetings appear leaders charged with judging the differences that can arise in this turbulent assemblage of armed men.

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For example, the Targist market, which has particular importance since it is found at the crossing of the principle routes of passage in the region of the Haut-Ghis, is under the supervision of "amghars" especially designated by three neighboring tribes, the Beni Mesdwi, Targist, Zerqet. These chiefs hold their meetings in an isolated "tahanout," and on their initiative the public crier announces to all the established rule: "O Mussulmans! Know that there /253/ exists among us an agreement concerning the souq /sook/ of the Oued, valid for three days, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. He who kills someone must pay 2,000 Spanish douros; if he only wounds him, he gives 1,000 douros. He who stops a drover of beasts during these three days must give back the other's property and pay 500 douros in fines; for our market is a market where peace prevails, O Mussulmans! and each one can verify this with his own eyes. May God blind the one who does not wish to see!" In spite of these precautions, however, shots burst out sometimes and the souq is broken up; when incidents occur again, the market disappears, to the great loss of the inhabitants of the country (1).

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[681]

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1. It is known that likewise in Kabylie /Kabylia/ the surveillance and the policing of markets are